Tuesday, July 30, 2019
Core Mountain Man Brewing Company Bringing the Brand
Core Marketing Mountain Man Brewing Company Bringing the Brand to Light 1. Overview Mountain Man Brewing Company (MMBC, or the Client) is a family-run business in West Virginia that has experienced much growth since launching its flagship premium beer Mountain Man Lager (MMB) in 1925. Over the decades, brand loyalty, quality and brand awareness have been the cornerstones of the Clientââ¬â¢s success ââ¬â the importance of the MMBC brand among consumers has allowed the company to build its small but consistent market share in the East Central region (ECR), particularly in its home state, the only region it distributes in (7. % of the market with more than 50 million USD in revenue). 2. Challenges & Opportunities * Challenges MMBC currently faces a potentially identity-changing challenge: The traditional premium beer market has been declining at a compound annual rate of 4%, and MMB experienced a 2% decrease in revenue last year, the first drop in its entire history; accordingly, MMBCââ¬â¢s target aim is to recover from the 2% decrease in revenue that occurred in the prior year. * OpportunitiesThe light beer market ââ¬â popular with younger drinkers ââ¬â has also been growing at a CAGR of 4%. Although MMBC has been historically weak in the 35-years-and-under segment, there is opportunity to generate more sales by releasing a new Mountain Man Light Beer (MML) line to target this younger market. However, there is the risk of negatively impacting their current distribution of MMB through shelf-space cannibalization and higher costs; as well as the risk of alienating their core segment of older, blue-collar drinkers. . Analysis MMBC faces potentially losing more revenue at the current forecasted compound annual decrease rate of 2% ââ¬â the projected decrease for MMB standalone in year-to-year net revenue from actual 520,000 barrels sold in 2005 (USD 50. 4 m) to 470,039 barrels (approximately USD 45. 6 m) by 2010 totals nearly 10% (see Exhibit 1). According to the key age demographics among beer drinkers, MMBââ¬â¢s customer segmentation is currently as follows: 64% for 45 years and up, and only 17% for 35 years and under.Yet the ECR breakdown for consumption by beer type is the opposite: 50. 4% for light and only 19. 7% for premium. Due to the overwhelming potential in the light beer market, we have prepared projections on growth in revenues and expenses for MMBC should they decide to move forward with brewing Mountain Man Light (see Exhibit 2A, 2B). * Making Mountain Man Lighter (and More Profitable) Considerations have been made regarding MMB remaining as a stand-alone product (again, see Exhibit 1).However, per the Clientââ¬â¢s instructions, this report will focus on projected performance examining MMBCââ¬â¢s entry into the light beer market at their expected MMB reduction rate of 20%. According to our analysis, MML would still result in a significant increase in revenue within two years: With the new product mix , net income margin increases from an insignificant 0. 88% in MMLââ¬â¢s first year to a robust 3. 7% by its second year (2007), even with considerations on the additional expenses that would go into launching a new product ââ¬â manufacturing, advertising, general operating (see Exhibit 2A). Additionally, the projected MMB+MML sales volume after only two years would nearly match MMBCââ¬â¢s current volume level ââ¬â 500,895 barrels to 520,000 ââ¬â and would eventually overtake the 2005 figure in 2008; while standalone figures show a continuous decrease from the 2005 benchmark and eventually fall behind MML sales by 2011 (Exhibit 3). * Issues to Consider The forecast for MMB +MML sales are promising.However, JAFREM must note significant issues to consider with the presented data: 1) Due to limited sales volume for the first six years, impact on COGS has not been taken into consideration; should the current production capacity levels be exceeded, additional inputs rega rding CAPEX (for example, for new plants) will be necessary. 2) With the forecasted MML growth rate, the Clientââ¬â¢s market share in the ERC amounts to 1. 5% after five years; MMB has not achieved this level after more than 50 years in the business and so considerations on the MMB reduction rate have also been provided (Exhibit 2B). 4. RecommendationsLight beer is an attractive proposition for MMBC, especially with the decrease in the premium beer segment. Accordingly, ignoring the dynamic growth in the light segment is simply too much of an opportunity to let pass. In order to reduce the risks that come with launching MML (alienating core customers, promoting a failed product), we recommends the following measures: * To avoid losing brand equity at the consumer level for MMB, pilot the MML launch outside West Virginia, as this is MMBCââ¬â¢s strongest and most loyal market; should the testing prove successful, then consideration can be made on moving into West Virginia. Shoul d the MML growth forecast not be realized after two years, return focus to MMB distribution at a national level; while advertising and sales at the grass roots level has been good for MMBC, there has been no attempt to reach a larger marketing through the traditional channel of television media. * Despite the expected decrease in the premium beer market, MMB still has potential to capture more market share by expanding its advertising activities and consumer base outside the ERC. Exhibit 1 ââ¬â Lager Standalone Projections MMB Standalone (next five years)à | | 2005| 2006| 2007| 2008| 2009| 2010| Barrels| 520,000| 509,600| 499,408| 489,420| 479,631| 470,039| Price per Barrel| $97. 00| $97. 00| $97. 00| $97. 00| $97. 00| $97. 00| Net Revenue| 50,440,000| 49,431,200| 48,442,576| 47,473,724| 46,524,250| 45,593,765| COGS| 34,803,600| 34,107,528| 33,425,377| 32,756,870| 32,101,732| 31,459,698| Gross Margin| 15,636,400| 15,323,672| 15,017,199| 14,716,855| 14,422,517| 14,134,067| SG&A | 9,583,600| 9,583,600| 9,583,600| 9,583,600| 9,583,600| 9,583,600| Other Op. Exp. 1,412,320| 1,412,320| 1,412,320| 1,412,320| 1,412,320| 1,412,320| Operating Margin| 4,640,480| 4,327,752| 4,021,279| 3,720,935| 3,426,597| 3,138,147| Other Income| 151,320| 151,320| 151,320| 151,320| 151,320| 151,320| Net Income before Tax| 4,791,800| 4,479,072| 4,172,599| 3,872,255| 3,577,917| 3,289,467| Prov. Income Tax| 1,677,130| 1,567,675| 1,460,409| 1,355,289| 1,252,271| 1,151,314| Net Income After Tax| 3,114,670| 2,911,397| 2,712,189| 2,516,965| 2,325,646| 2,138,154| Net Present Value| 3,114,670| 2,599,461| 2,162,141| 1,791,526| 1,477,990| 1,213,246|Exhibit 2A ââ¬â MMB + MML Projections | 2005| 2006| 2007| 2008| 2009| 2010| 2011| MML Barrels| 0| 48à 735| 101à 369| 158à 136| 219à 282| 285à 066| 355à 763| MMB Barrels| 520à 000| 407à 680| 399à 526| 391à 536| 383à 705| 376à 031| 368à 510| Growth%| à | -12%| 10%| 10%| 10%| 10%| 10%| Price per Barrel| $97| $97| $97| $9 7| $97| $97| $97| Net Revenue| 50à 440à 000| 44à 272à 273| 48à 586à 872| 53à 318à 166| 58à 489à 738| 64à 126à 451| 70à 254à 508| COGS| 34à 803à 600| 30à 776à 437| 34à 000à 363| 37à 531à 192| 41à 386à 351| 45à 584à 213| 50à 144à 138| COGS/Revenue| 69. 00%| 69. 52%| 69. 98%| 70. 39%| 70. 6%| 71. 08%| 71. 37%| Gross Margin| 15à 636à 400| 13à 495à 837| 14à 586à 509| 15à 786à 974| 17à 103à 387| 18à 542à 239| 20à 110à 370| SG&A| 9à 583à 600| 11à 233à 600| 10à 483à 600| 10à 483à 600| 10à 483à 600| 10à 483à 600| 10à 483à 600| Other Op. Expenses2| 1à 412à 320| 1à 412à 320| 1à 412à 320| 1à 412à 320| 1à 412à 320| 1à 412à 320| 1à 412à 320| MML, Extra Ad Expenses| 0| 400à 000| 400à 000| 400à 000| 400à 000| 400à 000| 400à 000| Op. Expenses| 10à 995à 920| 13à 045à 920| 12à 295à 920| 12à 295à 920| 12à 295à 920| 12à 295à 920| 12à 295à 920| %| à | 18. 64%| -5. 75%| 0. 00%| 0. 00%| 0. 00%| 0. 00%| Op.Profit| 4à 640à 480| 449à 917| 2à 290à 589| 3à 491à 054| 4à 807à 467| 6à 246à 319| 7à 814à 450| Op. Margin| à | -90. 30%| 409. 11%| 52. 41%| 37. 71%| 29. 93%| 25. 10%| Other Income| 151à 320| 151à 320| 151à 320| 151à 320| 151à 320| 151à 320| 151à 320| Net Income before Tax| 4à 791à 800| 601à 237| 2à 441à 909| 3à 642à 374| 4à 958à 787| 6à 397à 639| 7à 965à 770| Prov. Income Tax| 1à 677à 130| 210à 433| 854à 668| 1à 274à 831| 1à 735à 575| 2à 239à 173| 2à 788à 019| Net Income After Tax| 3à 114à 670| 390à 804| 1à 587à 241| 2à 367à 543| 3à 223à 212| 4à 158à 465| 5à 177à 750| Net Income Margin| 6. 18%| 0. 88%| 3. 27%| 4. 44%| 5. 51%| 6. 48%| 7. 7%| NPV| 3à 114à 670| 348à 932| 1à 265à 339| 1à 685à 170| 2à 048à 409| 2à 359à 625| 2à 623à 209| Exhibit 2B ââ¬â Inputs & S tress Test Results Inputs| | Stress scenario| MMB, Avg. Market Share Growth| 0. 25%| | Year| MML, Avg. Market Share Growth| Reduction Rate| MMB, Var. Cost per Barrel| 66. 93| | 2006| 0. 04%| 30. 19%| MML, Var. Cost per Barrel| 4. 69| | 2010| 0. 28%| 17. 28%| Reduction Rate| 20%| | 2011| 0. 23%| 21. 80%| Discount Rate| 12%| | | | | MMB, Growth Rate| -2%| | | | | Price per Barrel | $97| | | | | MMB, Extra Ad Expenses| $0| | | | | MML Growth Rate| 2%| | | | | MML, SG&A in 2006| $900,000| | | | |MML, SG&A Extra Launch| $750,000| | | | | Exhibit 3 ââ¬â MMB (stand alone) vs. MMB + MML ââ¬âââ¬âââ¬âââ¬âââ¬âââ¬âââ¬âââ¬âââ¬âââ¬âââ¬âââ¬âââ¬âââ¬âââ¬â [ 1 ]. Forecast prepared according to the 2% compound annual decrease rate provided by the Client [ 2 ]. SG&A and Other Operating Expenses are quantity independent in the consider range of production. [ 3 ]. The Stress Scenarios included in this Exhibit denote the maximum reduction rat e possible in order to achieve the target market growth desired by the Client should they move ahead with MML; in order to remain profitable, these are the reduction rate ceilings.
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